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Abstract 
This paper estimates a reduced-form model to assess the insolvency risk of 
General Insurance (GI) firms in the UK. In comparison to earlier studies, it uses a 
much larger sample including 30 years of data for 515 firms, and also considers a 
much wider set of possible determinants of insolvency risk. The empirical results 
suggest that macroeconomic and firm-specific factors both play important roles. 
Other key findings are the following: insolvency risk varies across firms 
depending on their business lines; there is default clustering in the GI industry; 
different reinsurance levels also affect the insolvency risk of insurance firms. The 
implications of these findings for regulators of GI firms under the newly launched 
Solvency II are discussed.  
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1.  Introduction 
The UK‘s non-life insurance industry is worth £60bn and is the largest in Europe and the 
third largest in the world (after the US and Japan). It comprises more than 300 active firms 
(both domestically- and foreign-owned); 
1
 in addition, 94 Lloyd‘s syndicates also underwrite 
non-life business (Lloyd's Annual Report 2014). In total, it currently generates approximately 
£48.217bn in gross written premium income (International Underwriting Association, 2015).  
The failure of insurance firms may disrupt the financial industry as a whole, increase 
systemic risk and affect negatively the real economy. Solvency I (Directive 73/239/EEC) was 
introduced in 1973 for the prudential regulation of European insurance companies. It aimed 
to provide harmonised solvency requirements across the EU countries. It turned the EU into 
one of the most competitive markets in the world. Under Solvency I, all insurers in the EU 
applied one common solvency margin rule establishing the minimum capital requirements for 
insurance firms. However, Solvency I did not follow a risk-based approach and could not 
truly reflect the risk faced by insurers. For example, it considered the book value of assets 
instead of their market value. 
Solvency II was launched on 1 January 2016, has been implemented in all 28 EU member 
states including the UK, and has achieved the harmonisation of asset and liabilities valuation 
techniques for insurance firms in the EU. In the UK it is managed by the Prudential 
Regulation Authority, Bank of England. Solvency II requires insurers to hold more capital, 
specifically to have 99.5 percent confidence to cover the worst expected losses over a one-
year horizon. In this case the regulators are taking a risk-based approach to supervise firms: 
the riskier an insurer‘s business, the more provisions are required (which makes it important 
to investigate the probability of default of different business lines).  
This paper analyses the determinants of insolvency risk for UK general insurance firms rather 
than non-life and life insurance firms; this is because the huge difference between non-life 
                                                          
1
 In addition, more than 500 non-life insurance firms that are not regulated by the UK government are licensed 
by the European Economic Area to conduct business in the UK (Financial Services Authority, 2013). 
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and life insurers makes it inappropriate to mix them together, as discussed in more detail in 
the next section. More specifically, it estimates forward-looking default probabilities that 
could be useful to the central bank to supervise local insurance firms (for example, it could 
take earlier action in the case of risky firms before they breach solvency capital 
requirements). The chosen model could be used to analyse such issues in other countries as 
well, with the empirical results helping policy-makers to improve regulations on the basis of 
country-specific features.  
There exist very few studies providing evidence on default probabilities. This gap in the 
literature motivates the present paper. It is very difficult to access data on the insolvency risk 
of general insurance firms because very few have become ―insolvent‖ - the majority choose 
instead to transfer their business to other insurance firms or just stop underwriting new 
business. As an alternative, third-party rating agencies may provide a good overview of their 
financial condition. The main problem with external rating agencies is that not all insurance 
firms are rated and the ratings normally stay the same for many years. Also, different rating 
agencies such as A M Best, Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch have different rating 
methodologies and labelling systems.  
Under Solvency II, insolvency risk is defined as the risk of loss (or of adverse change) in the 
financial situation of a company which results from fluctuations in the credit standing of 
issuers of securities, counterparties and any debtors to which a Solvency II undertaking is 
exposed, in the form of counterparty default risk, spread risk, or market risk concentration.
2
 
In this paper, we assume that the insolvency risk of general insurance firms is made up of 
three components. The first is the credit quality of their investment portfolio, whose 
performance we measure using investment returns. The second is the counterparty risk 
through reinsurance activity and the purchasing of derivative contracts. A high reinsurance 
ratio and holding derivative contracts increase the credit risk exposure of firms. The 
reinsurance ratio and a dummy variable for the use of derivative contracts are therefore used 
in our study to capture this second component. In addition, the use of derivatives could also 
lead to an increase in the risk exposure of a firm, and thus its capital requirements and 
insolvency risk. The third is the direct default risk of insurers when their liabilities are greater 
than their assets and therefore they might become insolvent. The financial health of firms is 
                                                          
2
 Art. 13(32) of the Solvency II Directive. 
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measured here using the leverage, profitability, solvency and liquidity ratios. Size, growth 
and claims volatility are also taken into account.  
We consider different exit situations for firms, including insolvency and transferring business 
to a third party. Ours is the first study to use a very large dataset consisting of 30 years of 
data for 515 firms to analyse the credit risk of general insurance firms in the UK. We show 
that other risk factors (macroeconomic and firm-specific factors), in addition to the standard 
ones considered by the literature (i.e. interest rates, liquidity, profitability and leverage) affect 
insurers‘ insolvency. When assessing their profitability, we take into account profit from both 
the traditional underwriting business and investment activities. We estimate both the 
individual probability of default (PD) for all available firms and the joint one using pair 
correlations. Ours is the first paper to analyse the systemic risk of general insurance firms in 
the UK on the basis of their individual PD. Our results show high dependence between 
general insurance firms when their individual PDs are high; this suggests that the joint 
probability of default is higher during distress times. Finally, we examine the relationship 
between reinsurance and change in the insolvency risk of general insurance firms. Previous 
studies find that primary insurers can benefit from reinsurance contracts in many ways (e.g. 
they can hedge against risk, and hold more capital to underwrite new business). We show that 
reinsurers may also benefit from reinsurance activities by reducing their credit risk.  
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the relevant literature. Section 
3 discusses the data and the various determinants of risk considered. Section 4 outlines the 
modelling approach. Section 5 discusses the empirical results. Section 6 summarises the main 
findings and offers some concluding remarks. 
 
2.  Literature Review  
Insurance firms play a very important role in the economy allowing individuals and firms to 
transfer risk for a premium. The bankruptcy of insurance firms may reduce financial stability. 
Many studies (Carmichael and Pomerleano, 2002; Das et al., 2003; Lee, 2013 and Lee and 
Chang, 2015) suggest that they can enhance financial stability by transferring risk to multiple 
parties through insurance and reinsurance activities. Rothstein (2011) shows that a healthy 
and well-developed insurance industry will improve the stability of financial markets. In 
addition, insurance firms protect individuals and corporations from losses arising from 
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natural disasters such as floods etc. (Adams et al., 2005; Faure and Heine, 2011; Kugler and 
Ofoghi, 2005; Ward and Zurbruegg, 2000). 
Only a few studies analyse the insolvency risk of insurance firms because the insurance 
industry is thought to be less exposed to turbulence in financial markets than other industries 
such as banking. There are several possible reasons for this difference. Unlike banks, insurers 
do not accept deposits from customers, and therefore they do not face the risk of a sudden 
shortage in liquidity that may cause bank runs. Harrington (2009) argues that insurance firms 
have to comply with more rigorous capital requirements than other financial institutions, and 
as a result credit events in the insurance industry have a small effect on the stability of the 
financial system as a whole.  Das et al. (2003) suggest that the insurance industry is more 
stable because insurers do not suffer from bank runs, and the cancellation process for 
insurance policies takes longer than closing a bank account. Furthermore, because of larger 
premia, policy holders would suffer a loss if the policy were cancelled. Also, insurance firms 
often hold more long-term than short-term liabilities. Bell and Keller (2009) find that insurers 
are less interconnected than banks and there is less contagion among them. However, Janina 
and Gregor (2015) argue that insurance firms are becoming more similar to banks and 
increasingly contribute to the systemic risk of the financial sector. Further, a study by the 
Geneva Association (2010) indicates that the insurance industry increases systemic risk if 
insurers engage heavily in trading derivatives off the balance sheet or mismanage short-term 
financing activities. 
Recent developments have made the insurance industry less stable; in particular, the fast 
growth of financial derivatives has meant that insurance firms have become more engaged 
with banks (through trading financial derivatives and other investment activities). Schinasi 
(2006) and Rule (2001) find that more insurance firms are buying credit default swaps to 
hedge their credit risk and using alternative risk transfer (ART) tools such as catastrophe 
bonds to transfer the catastrophe risk to other investors. Also, investment in asset-backed 
securities has increased. As a result, as pointed out by Baluch et al. (2011), insurance firms 
have become more vulnerable during crises. This is also shown by studies such as those by 
Das et al. (2003), who find that linkages through reinsurance activities may cause several 
primary insurance firms to fail at the same time, and by Acharya et al. (2015), who suggest 
that large insurance firms are more likely to invest in high-risk assets because they are 
correlated with different financial institutions. Given the fact that insurance firms are 
becoming riskier, it is crucial to examine the drivers of insolvency risk. One of the 
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contributions of this paper is to assess the vulnerability of the UK insurance industry; to the 
best of our knowledge, this is the first time that this issue is examined in the case of the UK.  
In addition, the close linkages between insurance firms and banking crises are such that the 
failure of the former greatly affects the stability of financial markets. For example, Main 
(1982) shows that banks can avoid some bad debts by working with them. This is because the 
information on obligors provided by insurance firms helps banks to understand better 
individual and corporate risk exposures. In addition, by mitigating the losses during natural 
disasters, insurance firms help to reduce the probability of default of some investors (policy 
holders, both individual and corporate) who, sometimes, are the same obligors as those of 
banks (Lee et al., 2016). Lehmann and Hofmann (2010) show that banks are more likely to 
transfer part or all of their risks to other financial sectors to avoid high correlation between 
assets that may lead to a higher default probability. Trichet (2005) shows that the insurance 
and banking industries are linked by ownership and the associations of credit exposure. As a 
result, insurance firms are playing a central role in financial markets and this may directly 
affect banks.  
Analysing the insolvency risk of insurance companies and establishing what causes their 
bankruptcy can help central bank supervision and reduce systemic risks in the financial 
industry. Most previous studies on credit risk focus on banking crises; early warning systems 
are well developed for banks (e.g., Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Borio and Drehmann, 
2009; Drehmann and Juselius, 2014; Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998; Barell et al., 
2010 and Schularick and Taylor, 2012). A few papers also study general insurance firms in 
the UK. One of the most recent papers on the UK non-life insurance industry is by Adams 
and Jiang (2016), who examine the relation between outside board directors and six measures 
of financial performance using panel data for 1999–2012 drawn from the UK‘s general 
insurance industry. Analysing unbalanced (1987–2010) panel data, Upreti and Adam (2015) 
find that reinsurance enables primary insurers to have sufficient risk capacity for planning 
and pricing new business lines. Shiu (2011) uses data from 1985 to 2002 to investigate the 
relationship between reinsurance and capital structure; he shows that insurers with higher 
leverage tend to purchase more reinsurance, and those with higher reinsurance dependence 
tend to have a higher level of debt. Using the same database, Shiu (2007) shows that an 
insurer‘s size, liquidity, interest rate risk exposure, line of business concentration and 
organisational form are important factors associated with the decision to employ financial 
derivatives. Adam et al. (2003) explore the determinants of credit ratings in the UK insurance 
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industry analysing a sample of 65 firms over the period from 1993 to 1997; they find that 
mutual insurers are generally given higher ratings than non-mutual ones, and also that 
liquidity and profitability have a significant positive effect on ratings. 
Given the fact that insurance firms play a central role in financial markets and are becoming 
more engaged with banks, analysing their insolvency risk is clearly important. Within 
insurance firms, general insurers provide non-life insurance including property cover, health 
insurance, liability policies and miscellaneous financial loss cover for individual, firms and 
others. Unlike life insurers offering to individuals products such as annuities, conventional 
life insurance and other savings products, general insurance firms have shorter-term liabilities 
and are more vulnerable. Because of the big difference between general insurance and life 
insurance firms, it is inappropriate to mix them together. In the present study, we employ a 
reduced-form model to assess the insolvency risk for general insurance firms in the case of 
the UK.  
3.  Data and Covariates  
Firm-specific variables are collected from SynThesys Non-Life.
3
 This consists of FSA (now 
regulated under the Prudential Regulation Authority, Bank of England) non-life annual return 
regulatory data. This database gives access to FSA return data for the current year and past 
years back to 1985. Over 400 companies are covered by the current SynThesys Non-Life 
system and the data include statements of solvency, components of capital resources, 
statements of net assets, calculations of capital requirement, analysis of admissible assets, 
liabilities, the profit and loss account, analysis of derivative contracts, summary of business 
carried on, technical account, analysis of premiums, analysis of claims, analysis of expenses, 
analysis of technical provisions etc. Also, approximately 180 ratios are included, with all the 
underlying calculations being done by SynThesys.  
Since most general insurance firms are small and non-public, there is no specific default list. 
Further, in the UK market, instead of becoming insolvent, most general insurance firms go 
into ‗Run-Off‘ (i.e. stop underwriting new business and wait for their financial condition to 
improve or transfer their business to others). All the credit events in our paper have been 
collected by hand from Appendix D: Company Changes, Transfers, Mergers of SynThesys 
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Non-Life UserGuide version 10.1
4
, PwC - Insurance insolvency
5
 and Financial Services 
Compensation Scheme
6
, and the final list
7
 has been further discussed with technical 
specialists and senior supervisors from the Insurance Division at the Bank of England. 
Macroeconomic data have been obtained from the World Bank. Therefore, ours is a unique 
dataset for the insurance industry in the UK. 
Before analysing the data, we remove firms without at least one-year balance data for all the 
variables. This is because such firms cannot be used to calibrate the model. We also remove 
firms for reasons such as merger and acquisitions or simply running off and disappearing. 
More discussion of the different types of firms‘ exit can be found in the model section. In the 
end, we are left with 366 firms with 14 firm-specific variables and 6 macroeconomic 
variables in our dataset spanning from 1986 to 2014. They include 35 firms that became 
insolvent during that period and 45 firms that exited owing to other reasons such as 
transferring their business to other firms. 
To lessen the effect of outliers, we cap the reinsurance ratio and leverage ratio at the 95 
percentile value and remove the lower 5 percentile value. We also cap the liquidity ratio, 
profitability ratio, combined ratio, growth premium written change, claim change and excess 
capital ratio at the 99 percentile value and remove the lower 1 percentile value. The summary 
statistics and correlation matrix of firm-specific and macroeconomic variables respectively 
are reported in Tables 1, 2 and 3. 
3.1 Covariates 
Following the literature, 
8
 we choose the following firm-specific variables: leverage (Net 
Technical Provisions /Adjust Liquid Assets, SynThesys Appendix K: Ratio Definitions R12), 
profitability (underwriting profit to Total Assets), growth (the change in the natural logarithm 
of total admissible assets), firm size (the natural logarithm of total admitted assets), 
reinsurance (the ratio of Reinsurance Premiums Ceded to Gross Premium written), claims 
                                                          
4
 Updated on November 2014. 
5
 http://www.pwc.co.uk/services/business-recovery/insights/insurance-insolvency-case-updates-pwc-uk.html 
6
 http://www.fscs.org.uk/what-we-cover/products/insurance/insurance-insolvencies/ 
7
 The insolvency cases include AA Mutual Intl Ins, Andrew Weir Ins, Anglo American, Atlantic Mutual Intl, 
BAI (Run-Off), BlackSea&Baltic, Bryanston Ins, Chester St Emp, City Intl Ins, Drake Ins, Exchange Ins, 
FolksamIntl UK, Highlands Ins UK, HIH Cas&Gen Ins, Independent Ins, Island Cap Europe, London Auths 
Mut, Millburn Ins, Municipal General, North Atlantic Ins, OIC Run-Off, Paramount Ins, Scan RE, 
SovereignMar&Gen, UIC Ins, Baloise Ins Ukbr, East West Ins, Fuji Intl Ins, Hiscox Ins, Metropolitan RE, 
Moorgate Ins, Nippon InsCo Europe, Polygon Ins UK, Swiss RE (UK), Tower Ins Ukbr. 
8
 Brotman (1989), Adams (1995), Pottier (1997, 1998), Adams et al. (2003) and Shiu (2011) etc. 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
9 
 
change (the change in net claims incurred), capital (the change in excess capital resources to 
cover general business CRR), liquidity (Cash/Total Asset: the ratio of the sum of cash and 
short-term investments to total assets), gross premium written (the annual change in gross 
premium written), combined ratio (Incurred Claims + Management Expense) / Gross 
Premium Written), Line-of-Business Concentration (Herfindahl index), organisational form 
(mutual or non-mutual firm) and a derivative dummy variable (defined on the basis of 
SynThesys form 17
9
, i.e. whether the sum of form 17 is zero or not). In addition, we also 
include UK macroeconomic variables, namely GDP growth, the change in the wholesale 
price index (2010=100), the change in foreign direct investment, net inflows, the real interest 
rate, the real effective exchange rate index (2010=100) and the change in the credit provided 
by financial institutions (% of GDP), all series coming from the World Bank. 
3.1.1 Traditional Risk Factors 
Traditional risk factors such as leverage, profitability, firm‘s growth rate, firm size, and 
liquidity are also important for assessing the insolvency risk of insurance firms. First, higher 
leverage may have an adverse effect on them by affecting their underwriting performance and 
making an insurer‘s capital more vulnerable to economic shocks. Further, Adams et al. 
(2003) find that insurers with lower financial leverage are more likely to be given a higher 
credit rating. Previous studies such as Brotman (1989) and Pottier (1997, 1998) also report a 
negative relationship between financial leverage and the capital structure of insurance firms. 
Second, profitability (in our case, we split it into underwriting profitability and investment 
return) indicates the ability of insurance firms to generate a surplus to develop their current 
business and generate new business. A higher profitability ratio means that an insurance firm 
can manage expenses effectively and set competitive premium rates. Titman and Wessels 
(1988) and Frank and Goyal (2009) suggest that highly profitable firms have a lower debt 
ratio and hence a lower credit risk. Third, normally a positive firm‘s growth rate signals a 
good financial condition of that firm, but for issuers with significant new business growth 
                                                          
9
 Our dataset does not allow to distinguish between exchange-traded and OTC derivatives. Using the 
information from form 17, it includes the following types of derivatives used: Fixed-interest securities; Futures 
& contracts for differences: Interest rates; Futures & contracts for differences: Inflation; Futures & contracts for 
differences: Credit index/basket; Futures & contracts for differences: Credit single name; Futures & contracts 
for differences: Equity Index;  Futures & contracts for differences: Equity Stock; Futures & contracts for 
differences: Land; Futures & contracts for differences: Currencies; Futures & contracts for differences: 
Mortality; Futures & contracts for differences: Other; options: Swaptions; options: Equity index calls;options: 
Equity stock calls; options: Equity index puts; options: Equity stock puts; options: Options.  
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could be achieved by poor underwriting standards and mispricing strategy (Adams et al., 
2003). Borde et al. (1994) and Pottier (1997) find that this will lead to greater uncertainty 
about the capital reserve risk for insurance firms. Further, Frank and Goyal (2009) conclude 
that firms with a high growth ratio face more debt-related agency issues and higher associated 
cost. Fourth, studies such as Bouzouita and Young (1998) find that large insurers are less 
likely to become insolvent; they normally benefit from economies of scale, and given their 
sizeable market shares and higher ratings have lower financing costs than small insurers 
(Adams et al., 2003). Fifth, we use the cash ratio as a measure of a firm‘s liquidity. For 
insurance firms, a high liquidity ratio indicates good claim-paying ability. Previous studies 
such as Carson and Scott (1997) and Bouzouita and Young (1998) show a negative 
correlation between the liquidity risk and the credit rating of insurance firms. 
In addition, some commonly used macroeconomic variables such as GDP growth
10
, 
Wholesale Price
11
, Foreign Direct Investment
12
, Real Interest Rate
13
, Real Effective 
Exchange Rate
14
, Credit provided by Financial Institutions
15
 are also included in our model. 
3.1.2 Insurance-Specific Risk Factors 
We also include insurance-specific factors such as reinsurance, incurred claims growth, 
capital, gross premium written growth, a derivative dummy, organisational form, combined 
ratio, and line-of-business concentration to capture the additional default risk information 
within the insurance industry.  
                                                          
10
 The annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices is calculated using values in 2005 US dollars. 
11
 Change of Wholesale Price Index (2010=100). The wholesale price index includes a mix of agricultural and 
industrial goods at various stages of production and distribution, including import duties. 
12
 Change of Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows. Foreign Direct Investment is defined as direct investment 
equity flows in the reporting economy. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, and other 
capital. Direct investment is a category of cross-border investment associated with a resident in one economy 
having control or a significant degree of influence on the management of an enterprise that is resident in another 
economy. 
13
 The real interest rate is the lending interest rate adjusted for inflation as measured by the GDP deflator. The 
terms and conditions attached to lending rates differ by country, however, which limits their comparability. 
14
 Real Effective Exchange Rate Index (2010=100). The real effective exchange rate is the nominal effective 
exchange rate (which measures the value of a currency against a weighted average of several foreign currencies) 
divided by a price deflator or cost indexs. 
15
 Change of Credit provided by Financial Institutions (% of GDP). Domestic credit provided by the financial 
sector includes all credit to various sectors on a gross basis, with the exception of credit to the central 
government, which is net. The financial sector includes monetary authorities and deposit money banks, as well 
as other financial corporations when data are available (including corporations that do not accept transferable 
deposits but incur such liabilities as time and savings deposits). Examples of other financial corporations are 
finance and leasing companies, money lenders, insurance corporations, pension funds, and foreign exchange 
companies. 
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First, reinsurance is widely used by insurance firms to reduce capital requirements but makes 
them exposed to counterparty risk. Berger et al. (1992) point out that there are two types of 
traditional reinsurance activities involving a direct insurer ceding all or part of its assumed 
underwritings to another insurance company. Insurance firms transfer part of their risk to 
third parties by reinsurance, which results in lower uncertainty concerning their future losses 
and enables them to reduce their capital reserves. Adams (1996) suggests that reinsurance 
improves the ability of the primary insurer to survive an external economic shock. On the 
other hand, the financial health of a heavily reinsured firm will be adversely affected by the 
insolvency of reinsurance firms. It should be noticed that the reinsurance firms discussed in  
Section 5 are those taking reinsurance from primary insurers. 
Second, claims‘ growth16 will directly affect the capital of an insurance firm. In the insurance 
industry, incurred claims are the amount of outstanding liabilities for policies over a given 
valuation period. A significant increase in net claims may generate liquidity risk for an 
insurer, which will eventually become insolvent if it cannot raise enough capital. 
Third, the capital used to cover the insurance business is a key factor. When measuring the 
default risk of insurance firms, it is natural to include the Excess (deficiency) of capital 
resources to cover general business CRR (Capital Requirements Regulation). Insurance firms 
should hold enough capital to cover the policies they underwrite. 
Fourth, the growth in the gross premium written reflects how well an insurance firm is 
running its core business; a rapidly growing gross premium written may indicate potential 
huge losses (claims) in the future. Generally speaking, an increase in gross premia written
17
 
indicates that the insurance firm is in a good financial condition. Incorporating this variable 
into the model will automatically exclude ‗run-off‘ firms from the sample; these are very 
common in the insurance industry (insurance firms can stop underwriting business but still 
exist for many years). 
Fifth, whether or not an insurance firm is involved in derivative trading will affect its credit 
risk; hence, we add a derivative dummy to our model. Shiu (2011) notes that insurers use 
derivatives to hedge risk, which may also increase their exposure to counterparty risk (for 
OTCs). The dataset does not allow to distinguish between OTC and exchange trade 
                                                          
16
 The difference in annual incurred claims. 
17
 These are the total premia written, which include both direct and assumed premia written, before any 
reinsurance. 
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derivatives, but it does differentiate between derivatives for investment and hedging.  Our 
data
18
 are consistent with the findings of Shiu (2011), who reported that most insurers use 
derivatives for hedging purposes, and therefore their insolvency could increase because of 
these hedging activities (i.e. counterparty risk from OTCs or market risk from imperfect 
hedging). Following his study, we obtain label 1 for a derivative user by looking for nonzero 
values from Form 17 of the PRA returns. For example, if insurance firms trade derivatives (in 
which case they report the derivatives usage in form 17, and therefore the sum of form 17 
will not be zero) then the dummy takes value 1, otherwise it is set equal to 0. 
Sixth, since most general insurance firms are not publicly listed, firms with different 
organisational forms, including mutual and non-mutual, can behave differently. Adams 
(1995) argued that the organisational form can partly affect the decision-making of insurance 
firms. A mutual insurance firm is an organisation that supplies insurance services, and that is 
owned by its customers, or members, which means that there are no shareholders to pay 
dividends to or to be accountable to. Such a firm can concentrate entirely on delivering 
products and services that best meet the needs of its customers. In our analysis we separate 
mutual and non-mutual firms. 
Seventh, insurance firms writing more new business (i.e. with fast growth in gross premium 
written) are normally in good financial health, but there is a potential mispricing problem 
(firms use a cheap premium to increase sales but do not generate enough money to cover 
future claims). This is captured by the combined ratio in our model, which is defined as 
Incurred Claims + Management Expense) / Gross Premium Written to capture any mispricing 
by insurers. 
Lastly, insurance firms usually run business in different areas; if the business is highly 
concentrated in a single area, this may lead to huge losses.  For example, an insurance firm 
focusing on properties will suffer a lot when floods or earthquakes happen. As a result, 
insurers with a high line-of-business concentration may have a higher earning risk. We follow 
Shiu (2011) in using the Herfindahl index H at the firm level to proxy the line-of-business 
concentration (a higher number indicates a lower level of business mix, the max value is 1), 
which is defined as: 
                                                          
18
 We checked the data on derivatives for hedging and investment and noticed that only 8 data-points correspond 
to trading derivatives for investment (i.e. insurance firms receive a fixed payment in exchange for taking risk).  
As a robustness test, we report the regression results in Appendix C when removing the 8 data-points for 
investment; the results are consistent with our original results. 
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   ∑  
 
 
   
 (1) 
where    is the premium written for business line i as a percentage of the Gross Premium 
Written (i.e. divided by the total premium written for all business lines), and   represents the 
number of different types of business lines in which the firms are involved. 
 
3.2 Summary Statistics 
As already pointed out, the insurance industry is relatively more stable than other industries. 
This is confirmed by Table 1, which shows that the standard deviation (Std) of underwriting 
profitability (PT) and investment return (InvR) is very small.
19
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Insurance firms, on average, have a higher investment profit than the traditional underwriting 
profit.
20
 This could be driven by derivative trading (Schinasi, 2006) and Rule, 2001). On 
average, general insurance firms in the UK have high capitalisation, the reason being that 
they have to comply with more rigorous capital requirements than financial institutions 
(Harrington, 2009). The size of firms changes a lot over the sample period that we are 
considering, suggesting that, although the industry as a whole is relatively stable, many 
insurance firms transfer their business to others before they become insolvent.
21
 This is also 
why we consider the transfer of business to other companies as a possible form of exit. The 
high volatility of the combined ratio (Combined) could be due to mispricing problems. The 
Herfindahl index is 0.714 on average, with a small standard deviation. This further supports 
the view that insurance firms are stable and their business is not very diverse. 
Table 2 shows that, over the full sample, on average default firms have a negative 
underwriting profit (PT) and change in gross premium written (GPW %), a low cash ratio 
(CA), a small incurred claim increase (Claim %), a small excess capital increase (Excess %) 
                                                          
19
 Compared to banks, insurers do not face the risk of a ‗bank run‘ and claiming payments from them normally 
takes longer than withdrawing cash from banks. 
20
 Investing in high-risk portfolios may yield higher returns than the normal underwriting business.  
21
 To protect the interests of policy-holders, insurance firms are more likely to stop writing new business or 
transfer their business to other firms rather than becoming insolvent. 
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and a low investment return (InvR). This may indicate that they lose money from their main 
business and their investment performance is not as good as in the case of other firms. They 
are relatively small-size firms with slow business growth, and holding less capital makes 
them more vulnerable. They also have higher leverage, reinsurance ratio, combined ratio and 
Herfindahl index (H-index), which suggests that they are more exposed to interest risk, credit 
risk and market risk. Overall, the evidence in Table 2 confirms the previous findings of the 
literature (see, e.g., Adams et al., 2003 and Shiu, 2011).  
 [INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 3 shows the correlation matrix of the 12 firm-specific variables. No evidence of high 
correlations is found for any firm-specific variables; the maximum correlation is below 0.5. 
Underwriting profitability (PT) is negatively correlated to leverage (Lev) and the reinsurance 
ratio with a value of -0.271. This suggests that financing activities through debt and 
reinsurance may reduce profits. Another interesting finding is the negative correlation 
between PT and investment return; this supports our variable analysis in the previous section 
that splits profitability into core business (underwriting business) and investment activities.  
Firm size has a positive relationship with leverage (Lev) but a negative one with the cash 
ratio (CA), which indicates that large firms are relatively more leveraged and hold less cash.  
Gross premium written has a positive relationship with both firm‘s growth (0.318) and claims 
change (0.226). This suggests that if insurers write more premiums this will lead to a fast 
growth of the firm, but one should also take into account the potential cash outflows from 
large potential claims in future. It is important therefore for the model to capture mispricing 
problems by incorporating the combined ratio that is typical of firms growing rapidly and 
writing more business. 
Finally, firm size and the Herfindahl index (H-index) are negatively correlated with a value 
of -0.456, which suggests that large firms have a relatively less concentrated business. 
 
4.  The Model  
Default risk modelling has developed considerably in recent years. Beaver (1966, 1968) and 
Altman (1968) first proposed credit scoring models that calculate the default probability for a 
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firm using accounting-based variables. The structural model, first used by Merton (1974), 
applies option theory to derive the value of a firm‘s liabilities in the event of default.  
There are several issues arising in the context of such models. Estimating the probability of 
default on the basis of accounting data amounts to trying to predict a future event using 
financial statements designed to capture the past performance of a firm; therefore, the 
obtained estimates might not have strong predictive power about the future status of the firm. 
Also, Hillegeist et al. (2004) find that, owing to the conservatism principle, fixed assets and 
intangibles are sometimes undervalued relative to their market prices causing accounting-
based leverage measures to be overstated. As for the structural model, the value of a firm‘s 
assets is estimated at market prices; however, these may not contain all publicly available 
default-related information on the firm. Also, the term structure, off-balance and other 
liabilities are not well specified in structural models when calculating the default threshold of 
the firm, which may lead to inaccurate estimates of the default probability. 
For these reasons, in this paper instead we estimate default probabilities using reduced-form 
models that have become increasingly popular for individual firms in recent years. Jarrow 
and Turnbull (1995) first introduced this type of models, which were then extended by Duffie 
and Singleton (1999). They assume that exogenous Poisson random variables drive the 
default probability of a firm. A firm will default when the exogenous variables shift from 
their normal levels. The stochastic process in the model is not directly linked to the firm‘s 
assets value. This makes the models more tractable. Duffie et al. (2007) first proposed a 
doubly stochastic Poisson model with time-varying covariates and then forecast the evolution 
of covariate processes using Gaussian panel vector autoregressions. The model was further 
developed by Duan et al. (2012), who applied a pseudo-likelihood method to derive the 
forward intensity rate of the doubly stochastic Poisson processes at different time horizons. 
The Poisson process with stochastic intensities has been widely applied to model default 
events. The specification adopted in this paper assumes that the stochastic intensity has a 
linear relationship with macroeconomic and firm-specific variables. A doubly-stochastic 
formulation of the point process for default is proposed by Duffie et al. (2007), with the 
conditional probability of default within   years being given by 
  (    )   .∫  
 ∫ ( ( )  ( ))  
 
 
   
 
 ( )  |  /     (2) 
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where    is the Markov state vector of firm-specific and macroeconomic covariates, and  
   (the conditional mean arrival rate of default measured in events per year) is a firm‘s default 
intensity. The firm may exit for other reasons, such as merger and acquisition or transfer of 
business to other firms, in which case the intensity is defined as  . Thus the total exit 
intensity is     . 
 The forward default intensity is given by: 
   (  )     (  ( )    ( )       ( )          ( )    )  (3) 
  and the forward combined exit intensity is defined as: 
   (  )    ( )     (  ( )    ( )       ( )         ( )    )  (4) 
We use the pseudo-likelihood function derived by Duan (2012) to estimate the forward 
default intensity. The details of the derivation of its large sample properties can be found in 
Appendix A of Duan‘s (2012) paper. In short, the pseudo-likelihood function for the 
prediction time τ is defined as 
   (           )  ∏ ∏       (   ) 
   
   
 
          (5) 
Our sample period goes from 0 to T and the frequency is annual. Firm i first appears in the 
sample at     and     is the default time while     is the combined exit time. During the 
sample period, if firm i exits because of default, then     =    , otherwise     <    .   As 
previously explained,     are the covariates including common factors and firm-specific 
variables.  The prediction horizon τ is measured in years with      , and α and β are the 
model parameter sets for default and other exit processes respectively. 
According to the doubly stochastic assumption (also known as the conditional independence 
assumption), firms‘ default probabilities only depend on common factors and firm-specific 
variables and are independent from each other, i.e. the default of one firm will not influence 
other firms‘ exit probabilities. 
The likelihood function        (   ) allows for five possible cases for firm i: in the prediction 
time period it can survive, default,
22
 exit for other reasons (which in our sample means that 
the insurance firm transferred its business to other firms); it can also exit after or before the 
prediction time period: 
                                                          
22
 Default events are collected from SynThesys Non-Life and include insolvent, in liquidation, placed in 
administration and dissolved. 
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The pseudo-likelihood function          (   ) can be maximised numerically to obtain the 
estimated parameters  ̂ and  ̂. Owing to the overlapping nature of this function, the inference 
is not immediately clear. For example, at time    and the prediction horizon    , firm A‗s 
default over the 2-year period starting 1 year ahead (   to   ) will be correlated with firm‘s B 
default in the next time period (   in this case). 
In addition, the pseudo-likelihood function can be decomposed into default and other exit 
processes which contain parameter sets α and β respectively, and each process can be further 
decomposed into different prediction horizon  . As a result, the estimates  ̂ and  ̂ can be 
obtained at the same time. 
   ( ( ))  ∏ ∏     ( ( ))            
     
   
 
        (7) 
   ( ( ))  ∏ ∏     ( ( ))            
     
   
 
       (8) 
 
5.  Empirical Results 
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5.1 Estimations Results 
In our model, the logarithm of forward default intensity has a linear relationship with the 
covariates: 
   (  )    ( )    ( )       ( )          ( )    .  
     includes the following factors: GDP growth, real interest rate, real exchange rate, FDI, 
wholesale price change, underwriting profit, leverage, firm size, cash ratio, gross premium 
written change, reinsurance, incurred claims change, firm‘s growth, excess capital change, 
investment return, combined ratio, Herfindahl index, derivative dummy and organisational 
form. All covariates are lagged up to 3 years. For example, in the case of the one-year default 
prediction, all covariates are lagged by one year. 
Table 4 shows the main estimation results based on the full sample going from 1985 to 2014. 
Other exit (i.e. transferring business to others) outputs can be found in Appendix A. The 
original Solvency I Directive 73/239/EEC was amended by directive 2002/13/EC (non-life 
insurance) and became effective at the start of 2004. The policy changes were small (the 
absolute minimum amount of capital required has been increased and will be indexed in the 
future in line with inflation, whilst the method of calculating the required solvency margin 
remains essentially the same). However, the thresholds have been increased, and so has the 
power of supervisory bodies to intervene early to take remedial action when the interests of 
policy-holders are threatened. Therefore, as a robustness check, we also estimate the model 
over the subsample from 1985 to 2003; the results can be found in Appendix B. In brief, most 
results stay the same, except that some macroeconomic variables such as the real exchange 
rate and FDI become significant owing to changes in the economic environment. Concerning 
firm-specific variables, claims change becomes significant while the combined ratio and 
organisational form become insignificant. These are plausible findings since in the early 
years of the sample most firms were mutual firms, and therefore the organisational form does 
not matter. The results also suggest that mispricing (i.e. the combined ratio) is not the main 
reason for insolvency. Not surprisingly, the claims change variable is significant since natural 
disasters caused huge damage in the early 90s and more claims are one of the most important 
factors increasing the default probability of insurers.  
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
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Table 4 shows the results for the sample periods 1985 to 2014 with 1, 2, and 3 year horizons. 
Clearly, the annual data in our sample are not useful for predicting over periods longer than 1 
year. However, the multi-period design of the model may be useful when high-frequency data 
are used - for example, for analysing publicly listed insurance firms. This also suggests that 
central banks should ask firms to submit data more frequently for better supervision
23
. 
Next, we analyse the results based on the 1-year prediction. Most of them are in line with 
those of Adam et al. (2003). Leverage, underwriting profit, liquidity, reinsurance and 
organisational form
24
 are significant factors both for assessing the insolvency risk of 
insurance firms and determining the quality of credit rating. On the other hand, firm size and 
growth are not significant.
25
 Further, we find that macroeconomic and firm-specific factors 
(the change of credit provided by financial institutions, wholesale price change, investment 
profitability, combined ratio, and the usage of financial derivatives) are also important, and 
therefore should not be neglected. To our knowledge this is the first study documenting their 
key role in determining the insolvency risk of insurance firms. 
Concerning macroeconomic variables, the real interest rate and the change in wholesale 
prices have a positive effect on default intensity that could lead to a higher default probability 
(PD). As for firm-specific variables, writing profitability and investment profitability are 
negatively correlated with default intensity. This suggests that high profitable firms are less 
likely to become insolvent.  Further, our results are consistent with those of Titman and 
Wessels (1988), Frank and Goyal (2009), Carson and Scott (1997) and Bouzouita and Young 
(1998), who show that higher liquidity is associated with a higher credit rating. Therefore, 
firms holding more capital tend to have higher liquidity and a lower default probability. 
Moreover, the one-year PD shows that writing more premiums will lower an insurer‘s default 
probability. Firms with larger gross premium written will not only have cash inflows in the 
short term but also potential claims in the long term. The rapid growth of gross premium 
written may also have caused the mispricing problem (i.e. selling more policies at a cheap 
price - this is captured by the combined ratio) and the increase in the default probability of 
insurers. Finally, highly leveraged firms are less likely to survive during recessions and 
therefore normally have a higher PD. 
                                                          
23
 In the UK, the Bank of England has been collecting quarterly data for more than 2 years; in the very near 
future, new data could be used in the model with multi-period prediction. 
24
 ‗Business Activitiy‘ in Adam et al. (2003). 
25
 This could be due to the different datasets used. Ours covers 366 general insurance firms and data from 1985 
to 2014. Adam et al. (2003) instead only consider 40 firms rated by A.M. Best plus 25 firms rated by S&P and 
include both general insurance and life insurance firms into the model. 
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There are also three more interesting findings. First, in general, large firms typically have a 
good reputation and therefore it is easier for them to obtain credit in the market. Bouzouita 
and Young (1998) find that large insurers are less likely to default. Our results suggest that 
firm size is not a significant determinant of the solvency of insurance firms.  
Second, ad hoc structured reinsurance may reduce the credit risk exposure - for example, 
Adams (1996) shows that reinsurance improves the ability of the primary insurer to survive 
an external economic shock. However, we find a positive relationship between reinsurance 
and PD, which suggests that heavily reinsured firms are more likely to default. Insurers 
transfer part or all of their risk to other insurers through reinsurance and release capital 
reserves; in this way they have resources to write new business. Insurers are exposed to the 
counterparty risk of reinsures (e.g. when reinsurers are insolvent or run off, insurers will have 
to pay the claims to the policy-holders) and their fast-growing business may lead to higher 
potential losses in the future.  
Third, one important question is whether using derivatives increases the counterparty risk or 
is only useful for hedging. For example, derivatives could be used for hedging risk, but Shiu 
(2011) shows that this could also increase the exposure to counterparty risk. Our findings 
indicate that the use of derivatives may increase the probability of a firm becoming insolvent. 
This has important implications for assessing risk in this industry. 
5.2 Overall Probability of Default for the General Insurance Industry 
In this section we estimate the default probabilities for all active firms as well as the survival 
firms. This is in fact the first study using historical default risk for all active firms based on 
their individual PD. We also consider the performance of insurance firms during natural 
disasters and financial distress times (that is, at times when insurers are vulnerable and more 
likely to default). Figure 1 below shows the probability of default for the General Insurance 
industry from 1986 to 2014. The PDs are calculated using the full-sample parameter 
estimates. 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 shows that the PD of insolvent firms is much higher and fluctuates 
more compared to the whole GI industry. The highest PD of insolvent firms is about 0.07, 
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which is almost six times that of the whole industry.  For the GI industry, the PD peaks 
around the early 90s and then decreases until 2000; it is relatively low but increased sharply 
in 2008, at the time of the global financial crisis. The PD of insolvent firms peaks around 
1990 and then decreases until 1996. There are two spikes in 2000 and 2003, before the 2008 
global financial crisis. The average PD for default firms is 365 bps and 118 bps for the whole 
industry (97 bps for survival firms). The standard deviation for default firms is 0.0378, which 
is much higher than for the whole industry (0.0253) and for survival firms (0.0230). In 
general, default firms are more risky compared to the whole GI industry. These results 
indicate that, unlike banks, GI firms are more sensitive to natural disasters than a global 
financial crisis. 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Figure 3 shows a large PD spread between insolvent firms and the whole GI industry during 
the early 90s and a sharp rise in 2000 and 2003. It is generally positive before 2010, and it 
increases rapidly during the financial crisis, which indicates that all insolvent firms faced a 
worse financial situation and are more vulnerable than the whole GI industry. After 2008 it is 
much smaller or even negative. 
To sum up, the default probability of the General Insurance industry varies over time and the 
PD of insolvent firms is more volatile than that of the survival firms. High PDs are usually 
found when there are disasters such as floods
26
; this indicates that, unlike other financial 
                                                          
26
 1990: The Burns‘ Day storm happened on 25-26 January 1990 across North-Western Europe and was one of 
the strongest European windstorms. It hit during the daytime and caused huge damage. There was severe 
flooding in England and insurers in the UK lost £3.37bn; it was the UK‘s most expensive weather event for 
insurers. 
1990-1991: There was an extremely cold winter in Western Europe. In the UK snow began to fall on the night 
of 7 December 1990 in the Midlands, Wales and the Pennines. Transport was severely disrupted and many 
people were trapped in their cars; moreover, there were power losses in many areas across the UK, and heavy 
rains and severe gales around Christmas and the New Year caused great damage to thousands of homes. There 
was more heavy snow in early February 1991 during the coldest winter since 1987. Temperatures stayed very 
low until 20 February. 
1998 Easter floods: Heavy rain started to fall on 9 April in the Midlands and then moved northwards causing 
severe floods. Thousands of housed were affected.  
2000: Severe flooding across the UK. 
2007: Floods affected Gloucestershire, Yorkshire, Hull and Worcestershire and caused £6 million damage. 
2008: Morpeth floods. There was flooding in the Midlands and North East England. £40 million damage. 
2009: In February 2009 heavy snow in the UK resulted in £1.3 billion damage. In November 2009 heavy rain 
caused flooding in many areas across the UK.   
2012: Great Britain and Ireland floods: most of UK experienced droughts in March, which was followed by the 
wettest April in 100 years. Heavy rains continued till July and resulted in flooding across the country. 
Widespread flooding and wind damage occurred in September, November, December, and January 2013.  
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institutions, insurance firms are relatively stable but very sensitive to natural disasters. The 
high PDs around the time of the 2008 financial crisis suggest that the insurance and banking 
industries may be closely correlated (further research is needed on this issue, which is beyond 
the scope of the present paper). Regulators should consider these interactions and be aware of 
the contagion effect in distress times.  
5.3 Probability of Default for Different Business Lines 
In general, insurance firms have business in different sectors and firms may change their 
main business line over time. In addition to business concentration, the change in the credit 
risk in different sectors has also important implication for the regulators‘ supervision and 
policy-making decisions. This crucial issue has been overlooked in the literature. Here we 
extend the credit risk analysis to the insurance firms‘ business lines. 
On the basis of the gross premium written by each firm for different business lines, we 
classify insurance firms into 7 groups: 1. Accident & Health; 2. Motor; 3. Marine, Aviation & 
Goods in Transit; 4. Third-party Liability; 5. Financial Loss; 6. Household& Domestic All 
risks and Property; 7. Miscellaneous. 
[INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
[INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
Around 1991, when natural disasters happened frequently, Motor has the highest default 
probability, with Accident & Health having the second highest. Third-party Liability has the 
third highest, Household & Domestic All Risk and Property and Marine, Aviation & Goods 
in Transit have a slightly lower PDs, financial loss has the lowest. After 1991, the PDs of all 
groups are decreasing, while until 1996, the PDs are fluctuating around their average. The 
PDs of most groups exhibit an upward trend during the 2008 financial crisis, the exceptions 
being Accident & Health as well as Miscellaneous, which are relatively flat. Among all 
groups, the Financial Loss has the highest PD. After the financial crisis, Financial Loss and 
Marine, Aviation & Goods in Transit become the riskiest groups.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
2013: St. Jude storm; in October 2013 storms and strong winds (up to 160km/h) hit the south of England and 
Wales. East Coast Tidal Surge: in December 2013 strong northerly winds caused a large tidal surge which 
resulted in severe flooding of the coastal areas.  
2013–14: United Kingdom winter floods: from December 2013 to February 2014 the south of England and 
Wales were hit by heavy rains and storms that caused flooding, power cuts and disruptions to transport. 
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Insurance firms are generally very vulnerable when natural disasters happen. Decomposing 
the PD of the insurance industry into different business lines reveals clear differences around 
the early 90s. Accident & Health, Household, Property, Motor, Transportation and Third-
party Liability are the riskiest businesses because they are more likely to be exposed to 
catastrophes such as floods, earthquakes etc. However, the PDs of all business lines have the 
same upward trend in distress times except Accident & Health and Miscellaneous that are 
less correlated with the financial market. These findings suggest that regulators might want to 
consider the varying composition of the premium written by insurance firms when setting 
capital requirements. This forward-looking PD could give supervisors at the central bank a 
warning sign of a risky business, and under Solvency II the central bank could take action, for 
instance requiring firms to provide an additional buffer before they breach their MCR 
(minimum capital requirement) and SCR (solvency capital requirement).
27
 
 
5.4 Default Clustering and Systemic Risk  
Since most insurance firms are non-public firms with a short history, very few of them are 
rated by credit rating agencies (e.g. Moody‘s, S&P, Fitch and A&M Best). Adam et al. 
(2003) analyse 65 non-life and life firms rated by A.M. Best and S&P, while our sample 
includes more than 300 GI firms. Using the estimation results from our model (see Table 4), 
we calculate PDs for all available firms (see equation 2). We then extend the analysis to 
investigate the joint default risk. We compute pair correlations
28
 of firms for different 
quantiles, and use the median value to obtain the default correlations. Previous studies such 
as Das et al. (2007) find strong default correlations among corporate obligors. It is interesting 
to establish whether insurance firms are likely to default jointly when their individual PDs are 
high. Also, high PD correlations may suggest that insurers are affected by common factors 
beside firm-specific factors. 
We calculate the average pair PD correlations of all firms within different groups (from low 
risk 0%-20% to high risk 80%-100%) based on data for the period 1985-2014. The highest 
                                                          
27
 The SCR and MCR act as trigger points in the ‗supervisory ladder of intervention‘ introduced by Solvency II. 
28
 The default correlations are estimated by calculating the pair PD correlations across firms in each quantile. A 
similar approach is taken by Duan and Miao (2016), who estimate the joint default probability on the basis of 
the individual firm‘s default probability that has been obtained first using the doubly stochastic Poisson model. 
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PD correlations are found in the 0%-20% quantile, and the second highest in the 20%-40%. 
The fact that the highest correlation is that between insurers with the lowest PD suggests that 
when insurance firms are less exposed to risk there is a more important role for common 
factors, in our case macroeconomic factors such as the credit supply and wholesale price 
changes. Insurers within the highest 80%-100% quantile have the third highest PD 
correlation, which indicates that their credit risk is affected by both common and firm-
specific factors. The observed pattern for PD correlations for different quantiles supports our 
choice of considering macroeconomic factors as well as firm-specific factors. Overall, our 
empirical results are in line with those of Bell and Keller (2009), who show that insurers are 
less interconnected than banks and there is a lower contagion effect among them. The PDs for 
the 20% quantile has the highest correlation (0.2111). The lowest correlation is -0.0170, 
while the PD correlation for the group ‗40% - 60%‘ is much higher (-0.0095), and the PD 
correlation for the group ‗20% - 40%‘ is slightly higher (0.1233). The ‗80%-100%‘ group has 
the third largest PD correlation (0.0315); this points to some default clustering. The highest 
PD correlation is found for the group ‗0%-20%‘, which suggests that in safe times most 
insurance firms are in a good financial situation. Overall, the results imply that systemic risk 
within general insurance firms is low. 
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5.5 Reinsurance and Default Risk 
 [INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
Reinsurance is a pure hedging contract that enables primary insurers to transfer risks to third 
parties (i.e. reinsurers receive a share of annual premia written from primary insurers to 
compensate them for potential loss events). Previous papers show that corporate hedging 
decisions such as reinsurance affect the strategic performance of firms (Harris and Raviv, 
1991; Adam et al., 2007). Aunon-Nerin and Ehling (2008) highlight that indemnity contracts 
such as reinsurance contracts are pure hedging instruments. Harrington and Niehaus (2003) 
argue that reinsurance is important because solvency risk matters to both policy holders and 
regulators. Upreti and Adam (2015) find that reinsurance enables primary insurers to have 
sufficient risk capacity for planning and pricing new business lines. Therefore, insurers can 
be exposed to new risks through risk financing as well as reinsuring activities.  
As already discussed, insurers with a high reinsurance ratio usually also have a high PD. 
Therefore the counterparty risk of reinsurance will increase the insolvency risk of primary 
insurers, and not surprisingly, under Solvency II, reinsurance assets
29
 are listed separately 
from cash and financial assets in an insurance firm‘s balance sheet; also, technical provision 
(i.e. provisions for expected future claims) of reinsurance has been incorporated into 
Solvency II as part of liabilities. Reinsurance activities link different insurers together and 
represent a contagion channel in the system in distress times; consequently, the performance 
of reinsurance firms (firms buying reinsurance) is very important for the whole general 
insurance industry. 
Next, we investigate the performance of firms when they use the reinsurance market. We first 
classify them into different groups based on the percentage of reinsurance they accept relative 
to their total written gross premium, and then we analyse the credit spread of firms who 
accepted reinsurance across the different groups.  
Reinsurance firms play a crucial role in the general insurance market. The orange line in 
Figure 6 shows that the percentage of firms in each size group changes over time. The total 
percentage of firms accepting reinsurance peaked in 1988 and decreased afterwards. Most 
firms accept less than 20% reinsurance, and this percentage has been decreasing since 1987. 
                                                          
29
 Reinsurance assets here refers to ceded reinsurance assets that are by definition only those of the cedant 
associated with ceded reinsurance contracts. 
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Less than 50% of firms have accepted 20% to 80% reinsurance, most of the time, in the last 
30 years. There are more than 15% of firms in the upper 20% group between 1996 and 2005, 
when this percentage peaked. The maximum spreads for each group are 67 bps, 111 bps, 66 
bps, 102 bps, 40 bps, and 38 bps respectively, and their standard deviations 0.0017, 0.0031, 
0.0022, 0.0032, 0.0018, and 0.0011. For each group, we calculate the credit spread between 
firms accepting reinsurance and firms not accepting it.  
Figure 6 shows that the lowest 20% firms have a negative spread in most periods, except 
during the early 90s, vis-à-vis the firms that do not use the reinsurance market. This may 
indicate that firms that are less involved with the reinsurance market often have good 
creditworthiness and take reinsurance as part of their business plan.
30
 By contrast, firms 
accepting 20% to 40% reinsurance can have either positive or negative spreads at different 
points in time in the sample period. During the financial crisis, their spread vis-à-vis firms not 
accepting reinsurance is positive. For the group of firms accepting between 40% to 60% and 
60% to 80% reinsurance, the spread is positive most of the time, except during the 90s.
31
 
Finally, for the group accepting more than 80% reinsurance the spread peaked during the 
early 90s (at the time of the Burns‘ Day Storm), and became relatively small during the  
financial crisis, and even negative (-0.0016) in 2008. This may reflect the fact that, for the 
pure reinsurance firms, their risk management strategy is aimed at reducing potential losses 
during distress times. 
In our sample, for all firms taking reinsurance (group 0%-100% in Figure 6) compared to 
firms not taking reinsurance, there are 19 years with a positive spread, and 10 years with a 
negative one. The results imply that firms accepting reinsurance have a higher default 
probability, especially when natural disasters happen (i.e. the Burns‘ Day Storm in the early 
90s).  
However, firms taking reinsurance performed well during the 2008 financial crisis. Four 
groups have a negative spread and other two have a nearly zero spread (0.0062 in group 20%-
40% and 0.0018 in group 60%-80%).  This is a new and important result. Firms taking 
reinsurance may choose a more determined risk management strategy and therefore buy 
good-quality reinsurance to help reduce risk at times of financial distress. Doherty and Tinic 
(1981) find that reinsurance contracts make primary insurers manage cash flow volatility 
                                                          
30
 Through reinsurance, firms will have less liability, fewer reserves requirement, but release more capital to 
write new business or investment in other products. 
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more effectively, and result in better future underwriting ability, and lower insolvency 
probability. Our results show that, on the other hand, reinsurers also benefit from indemnity 
contracts resulting in lower default probabilities. 
Overall, these findings suggest that firms taking reinsurance have a higher insolvency risk 
than those not doing so, and are more vulnerable when natural disasters happen. However, 
reinsurers outperform other insurers during financial crises. This may be due to the fact that 
their risk management strategy aims at reducing potential losses during distress times.  
In addition, under Solvency II, reinsurance assets are calculated on a best-estimate basis, 
which means that their market value is the discounted value of future cash flows; therefore, 
the default probability of reinsurers plays an important in this estimate. Our results clearly 
show that the insolvency risk of reinsurers depend on how much reinsurance they take. Thus, 
when estimating the future cash flows of reinsurance assets, the varying default probability of 
reinsurers should be taken into account. Given the fact that most general insurance firms are 
not rated, our model could provide an alternative way for policy-makers to measure the 
insolvency risk of reinsurers and the market value of reinsurance assets. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
This paper analyses the insolvency risk of general insurance (GI) firms in the UK using a 
unique dataset; specifically, a reduced-form model is estimated that considers both 
insolvency and other types of exit such as transferring business. Our results show that most 
traditional risk factors (for example, interest rates, liquidity, profitability, leverage etc.) are 
significant determinants of the insolvency risk of insurers. However, in contrast to other 
studies, we show that macroeconomic factors (wholesale price and credit provided by 
financial institutions) and firm-specific factors (growth premium written, reinsurance, usage 
of derivatives and organisational form) are also crucial for assessing the credit risk of GI 
firms. This represents new and interesting evidence. 
Further, we investigate the credit risk of firms with different business lines. We show that in 
the early 90s, owing to natural disasters, the group Motor had the highest credit risk, while 
after the financial crisis Marine, Aviation & Goods in transit and Financial Loss became the 
riskiest sectors. Our time-varying estimates of PD could be used as an early warning for risky 
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sectors to which regulators might want to apply more stringent minimum capital requirements 
before firms breach their MCR and SCR. We also show that the joint default correlation for 
different insurance firms is low, but there is a default clustering.  
Finally, our findings indicate that different reinsurance levels affect the insolvency risk of 
insurance firms. Primary insurers can lower their insolvency risk by buying reinsurance 
contracts from reinsurers. Moreover, the latter, despite taking on risk from primary insurers 
through this process, appear to have an even lower insolvency risk during periods of financial 
distress. The default probability of reinsurers can be used by policy-makers for the estimation 
of the market value of reinsurance assets of GI firms under the new Solvency II. 
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Appendix A - Multi-period Other Exit Estimation Outputs-Full Sample 
Horizon 1 2 3 
Parameters 
   C 1.762 -2.849 1.885 
 
(41.041) (10.496) (15.594) 
GDP_growth -0.054 -0.013 -0.007 
 
(0.160) (0.044) (0.073) 
Real_IR -0.074 -0.006 0.030 
 
(0.270) (0.073) (0.127) 
Real_EXrate 0.021 0.017 0.011 
 
(0.088) (0.022) (0.034) 
FDI % -0.024 -0.030 -0.087 
 
(0.188) (0.063) (0.116) 
Wholesale Price % -8.256 -2.653 -7.135 
 
(33.567) (8.757) (12.226) 
Credit by Financial % -0.566 -1.753*** -1.243 
 
(1.121) (0.676) (1.432) 
PT -2.803 -0.435 -0.931 
 
(14.372) (3.629) (6.189) 
Lev 0.206 0.310 0.290 
 
(1.733) (0.404) (0.686) 
Size -0.035 -0.002 0.025 
 
(0.130) (0.040) (0.064) 
CA -1.277 -1.353*** -1.017*** 
 
(0.862) (0.306) (0.332) 
GPW % -0.074 -0.042 -0.071 
 
(0.178) (0.054) (0.111) 
Rein 0.903 0.701 0.565 
 
(2.607) (0.750) (1.477) 
Claim % 0.054 0.059*** 0.048*** 
 
(0.045) (0.010) (0.009) 
Growth -0.297 -0.359* -0.376 
 
(0.770) (0.214) (0.391) 
Eecess % -0.024 -0.021 -0.038 
 
(0.116) (0.057) (0.078) 
InvR 9.165 5.986 3.839 
 
(141.332) (35.631) (64.311) 
Combined Ratio 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Herfindahl index 1.066*** 1.328*** 1.129*** 
 
(0.292) (0.261) (0.250) 
Derivative Dummy 0.736*** 0.736*** 0.611*** 
 
(0.229) (0.226) (0.211) 
Organisational Form 0.073 -0.063 -0.172 
  (1.279) (0.354) (0.586) 
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Log-likelihood 
  
-508.2668 
No. of observations     5022 
 
*Significant at 10% 
** Significant at 5% 
*** Significant at 1% 
 
Note: Multi-period default estimation outputs of other exit for 1,2, and 3-year time horizons. 
Coefficients of constant, GDP growth, real interest rate, real exchange rate, foreign direct 
investment %, whole sale price %, credit provided by financial institutions %, underwriting 
profit, leverage, size, cash ratio, gross premium written %, reinsurance, incurred claims %, 
growth, excess capital, combined ratio, investment return, Herfindahl index, derivative 
dummy and organisational form based on the full sample from 1985 to 2014. The values in 
parentheses in the table are the standard deviations. 
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Appendix B - Multi-Period Default Estimation Outputs – 1985-2003 
Horizon 1 2 3 
Parameters 
  C -28.819*** -36.933 -52.267* 
 
(9.384) (92.437) (29.640) 
GDP_growth -0.080 0.083 0.077 
 
(0.106) (0.386) (0.100) 
Real_IR -0.158** 0.195 -0.151 
 
(0.078) (0.277) (0.182) 
Real_EXrate 0.026** 0.024 0.036 
 
(0.013) (0.234) (0.059) 
FDI % 0.597** -0.003 0.137 
 
(0.245) (1.897) (0.774) 
Wholesale Price % 25.502*** 26.070 37.479 
 
(8.829) (65.336) (23.248) 
Credit by Financial % -5.934** -0.681 -0.270 
 
(2.323) (1.148) (0.696) 
PT -5.387*** -5.391 -4.779 
 
(1.283) (14.942) (6.642) 
Lev 0.468*** 0.513 0.506 
 
(0.116) (1.531) (0.537) 
Size 0.098 0.140 0.284* 
 
(0.067) (0.551) (0.148) 
CA 1.996*** 1.977 0.493 
 
(0.434) (3.151) (1.230) 
GPW % -0.949*** -0.910 -0.305 
 
(0.147) (0.802) (0.216) 
Rein 1.014*** 1.301 1.800 
 
(0.298) (3.800) (2.068) 
Claim % -0.074* -0.152 0.009 
 
(0.043) (0.381) (0.089) 
Growth -0.008 0.118 0.026 
 
(0.156) (1.030) (0.935) 
Eecess % -0.299** -0.364** -0.121 
 
(0.131) (0.158) (0.111) 
InvR -32.469*** -21.424 -0.056 
 
(5.148) (148.534) (55.823) 
Combined Ratio 0.002 0.000 -0.018*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.007) 
Herfindahl index 0.139 0.434 1.694*** 
 
(0.458) (1.739) (0.595) 
Derivative Dummy 0.736** 0.393 0.443 
 
(0.351) (1.436) (0.746) 
Organisational Form 0.136 0.207 0.211 
  (0.727) (0.748) (0.779) 
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Log-likelihood 
 
-248.0849 
No. of observations     3429 
 
*Significant at 10% 
** Significant at 5% 
*** Significant at 1% 
 
Note: Multi-period default estimation outputs of default for 1,2, and 3-year time horizons. 
Coefficients of constant, GDP growth, real interest rate, real exchange rate, foreign direct 
investment %, whole sale price %, credit provided by financial institutions %, underwriting 
profit, leverage, size, cash ratio, gross premium written %, reinsurance, incurred claims %, 
growth, excess capital, combined ratio, investment return, Herfindahl index, derivative 
dummy and organisational form based on the full sample from 1985 to 2003. The values in 
parentheses in the table are the standard deviations. 
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Appendix C - Multi-Period Default Estimation Outputs 
Horizon   1 2 3 
Parameters 
   C 
 
-15.958*** -24.967 -37.863 
  
(-5.312) (-76.076) (-31.626) 
GDP_growth -0.053 0.041 0.116 
  
(-0.053) (-0.489) (-0.214) 
Real_IR 
 
0.164*** 0.284** 0.145 
  
(-0.043) (-0.133) (-0.165) 
Real_EXrate 0.004 0.01 0.019 
  
(-0.009) (-0.209) (-0.075) 
FDI % 
 
0.02 -0.159 -0.121 
  
(-0.073) (-0.679) (-0.248) 
Wholesale Price % 12.372*** 16.387 25.995 
  
(-4.708) (-50.363) (-22.396) 
Credit by Financial % -3.640*** -0.291 -0.247 
  
(-1.045) (-0.465) (-0.925) 
PT 
 
-3.781*** -3.745 -3.74 
  
(-1.264) (-15.975) (-10.25) 
Lev 
 
0.523*** 0.551 0.551 
  
(-0.104) (-1.551) (-0.818) 
Size 
 
0.009 0.028 0.115 
  
(-0.05) (-0.453) (-0.185) 
CA 
 
1.027*** 1.049 -0.456 
  
(-0.320) (-1.829) (-0.907) 
GPW % 
 
-0.789*** -0.565 -0.077 
  
(-0.121) (-0.619) (-0.100) 
Rein 
 
0.822*** 1.118 1.544 
  
(-0.237) (-4.185) (-2.698) 
Claim % 
 
-0.023 -0.061 0.024 
  
(-0.024) (-0.237) (-0.047) 
Growth 
 
0.025 0.118 0.021 
  
(-0.118) (-0.906) (-1.134) 
Eecess % 
 
-0.388*** -0.45 -0.217 
  
(-0.127) (-0.332) (-0.233) 
InvR 
 
-30.644*** -21.03 -2.692 
  
(-4.766) (-161.663) (-85.657) 
Combined Ratio 0.003*** 0.002 -0.004** 
  
(-0.001) (-0.004) (-0.002) 
Herfindahl index 0.397 0.763 1.759*** 
  
(-0.408) (-1.645) (-0.542) 
Derivative Dummy 0.628* 0.162 0.25 
  
(-0.335) (-1.759) (-0.946) 
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Organisational Form 0.969*** 0.551 0.621 
    (-0.310) (-1.985) (-0.822) 
Log-likelihood 
  
-508.2668 
No. of 
observations       5022 
 
*Significant at 10% 
** Significant at 5% 
*** Significant at 1% 
 
Note: Multi-period default estimation outputs of default for 1,2, and 3-year time horizons. 
Coefficients of constant, GDP growth, real interest rate, real exchange rate, foreign direct 
investment %, whole sale price %, credit provided by financial institutions %, underwriting 
profit, leverage, size, cash ratio, gross premium written %, reinsurance, incurred claims %, 
growth, excess capital, combined ratio, investment return, Herfindahl index, derivative 
dummy and organisational form based on the full sample from 1985 to 2014. The values in 
parentheses in the table are the standard deviations. 
The derivative dummy is defined as being equal to 1 for insurance firms using derivatives for 
hedging, and 0 for the others. 
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics - Full Sample 
  Max Min Median Average Std 
PT 0.308  -0.296  -0.006  -0.007  0.064  
Lev 4.692  -0.031  0.598  0.624  0.461  
Size 17.834  1.289  11.315  11.341  2.180  
CA 0.992  0.001  0.115  0.206  0.228  
GPW % 11.208  -3.393  0.030  0.077  0.928  
Rein 1.000  0.000  0.244  0.323  0.296  
Claim % 25.891  -6.844  0.027  0.227  1.954  
Growth 6.471  -9.448  0.009  0.017  0.413  
Excess % 8.740  -4.156  0.049  0.168  0.959  
Combined 326.000  0.032  0.481  5.436  25.757  
InvR 0.110  -0.038  0.028  0.031  0.022  
H-Index 1.000  0.000  0.763  0.714  0.280  
 
Table 1. Maximum, minimum, median, average and standard deviation of firm-specific 
variables which including underwriting profit, leverage ratio, firm size, cash ratio, change of 
gross premium written, reinsurance ratio, change of incurred claims, growth ratio, change of 
excess capital, combined ratio, investment return and Herfindahl index of the whole industry. 
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Table 2 
Summary Statistics - Default Sample 
  Max Min Median Average Std 
PT 0.288  -0.241  -0.018  -0.025  0.058  
Lev 4.626  -0.001  0.806  0.865  0.594  
Size 15.251  5.816  11.458  11.327  1.661  
CA 0.969  0.001  0.120  0.194  0.197  
GPW % 8.026  -3.393  -0.067  -0.098  0.946  
Rein 1.000  0.000  0.442  0.445  0.266  
Claim % 25.073  -6.044  0.009  0.089  1.763  
Growth 1.590  -1.417  -0.020  -0.009  0.285  
Excess % 6.971  -3.427  0.007  0.085  1.012  
Combined 285.200  0.037  0.554  8.142  29.902  
InvR 0.087  -0.034  0.020  0.023  0.019  
H-Index 1.000  0.185  0.785  0.731  0.260  
 
Table 2. Maximum, minimum, median, average and standard deviation of firm-specific 
variables which including underwriting profit, leverage ratio, firm size, cash ratio, change of 
gross premium written, reinsurance ratio, change of incurred claims, growth ratio, change of 
excess capital, combined ratio, investment return and Herfindahl index of default firms. 
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Table 3 
Correlation Matrix of Firm-specific Variables 
  PT Lev Size CA GPW % Rein Claim % Growth Excess % Combined InvR H-Index 
PT 1.000  -0.271  -0.078  0.084  -0.002  -0.074  -0.074  -0.008  0.094  -0.023  -0.098  0.129  
Lev -0.271  1.000  0.352  -0.203  -0.006  -0.081  0.022  0.012  -0.040  0.018  -0.052  -0.173  
Size -0.078  0.352  1.000  -0.417  -0.012  0.003  0.003  0.152  0.053  -0.074  -0.081  -0.456  
CA 0.084  -0.203  -0.417  1.000  0.054  -0.163  0.013  0.014  0.028  -0.006  0.161  0.178  
GPW % -0.002  -0.006  -0.012  0.054  1.000  -0.047  0.226  0.318  0.020  -0.092  0.005  -0.055  
Rein -0.074  -0.081  0.003  -0.163  -0.047  1.000  0.000  -0.039  -0.001  0.040  -0.325  -0.137  
Claim % -0.074  0.022  0.003  0.013  0.226  0.000  1.000  0.185  0.015  0.000  0.009  -0.003  
Growth -0.008  0.012  0.152  0.014  0.318  -0.039  0.185  1.000  0.253  -0.128  -0.046  -0.070  
Excess % 0.094  -0.040  0.053  0.028  0.020  -0.001  0.015  0.253  1.000  -0.019  -0.004  -0.005  
Combined -0.023  0.018  -0.074  -0.006  -0.092  0.040  0.000  -0.128  -0.019  1.000  -0.047  0.120  
InvR -0.098  -0.052  -0.081  0.161  0.005  -0.325  0.009  -0.046  -0.004  -0.047  1.000  -0.057  
H-Index 0.129  -0.173  -0.456  0.178  -0.055  -0.137  -0.003  -0.070  -0.005  0.120  -0.057  1.000  
 Table 3. Correlation matrix of underwriting profit, leverage ratio, firm size, cash ratio, change of gross premium written, reinsurance ratio, 
change of incurred claims, growth ratio, change of excess capital, combined ratio, investment return and Herfindahl index of the GI firms. 
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Table 4  
Estimations Results 
Horizon 1 2 3 
Parameters 
   C -15.952*** -24.965 -37.863 
 
(5.312) (76.082) (31.626) 
GDP_growth -0.053 0.041 0.116 
 
(0.053) (0.489) (0.214) 
Real_IR 0.164*** 0.284** 0.145 
 
(0.043) (0.133) (0.165) 
Real_EXrate 0.004 0.010 0.019 
 
(0.009) (0.209) (0.075) 
FDI % 0.020 -0.159 -0.121 
 
(0.073) (0.679) (0.248) 
Wholesale Price % 12.367*** 16.385 25.995 
 
(4.708) (50.366) (22.396) 
Credit by Financial % -3.641*** -0.291 -0.247 
 
(1.045) (0.465) (0.925) 
PT -3.781*** -3.745 -3.740 
 
(1.264) (15.976) (10.250) 
Lev 0.523*** 0.551 0.551 
 
(0.104) (1.552) (0.818) 
Size 0.009 0.028 0.115 
 
(0.050) (0.453) (0.185) 
CA 1.027*** 1.049 -0.456 
 
(0.320) (1.829) (0.907) 
GPW % -0.789*** -0.565 -0.077 
 
(0.121) (0.619) (0.100) 
Rein 0.822*** 1.118 1.544 
 
(0.237) (4.185) (2.698) 
Claim % -0.023 -0.061 0.024 
 
(0.024) (0.237) (0.047) 
Growth 0.025 0.118 0.021 
 
(0.118) (0.906) (1.134) 
Eecess % -0.388*** -0.450 -0.217 
 
(0.127) (0.332) (0.233) 
InvR -30.642*** -21.029 -2.692 
 
(4.766) (161.676) (85.657) 
Combined Ratio 0.003*** 0.002 -0.004** 
 
(0.001) (0.004) (0.002) 
Herfindahl index 0.397 0.763 1.759*** 
 
(0.408) (1.646) (0.542) 
Derivative Dummy 0.627* 0.161 0.250 
 
(0.336) (1.764) (0.946) 
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Organisational Form 0.970*** 0.551 0.621 
  (0.310) (1.985) (0.822) 
Log-likelihood 
  
-508.2668 
No. of observations     5022 
 
*Significant at 10% 
** Significant at 5% 
*** Significant at 1% 
 
Table 4. Coefficients of constant, GDP growth, real interest rate, real exchange rate, foreign 
direct investment %, whole sale price %, credit provided by financial institutions %, 
underwriting profit, leverage, size, cash ratio, gross premium written %, reinsurance, incurred 
claims %, growth, excess capital, combined ratio, investment return, Herfindahl index, 
derivative dummy and organisational form based on full sample from 1985 to 2014. The 
model estimates the multi-period (up to 3 years‘ horizon) default probability of GI firms. In 
the following analysis, we calculate the default probability based on 1-year prediction. The 
values in parentheses in the table are the standard deviations. 
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Figure 1. PD of all firms.  This figure plots the one-year default probability of all GI firms 
(straight line) and survival firms (dash line) from 1986 to 2014. We first predict the default 
probability of individual firms based on the parameters estimated by the doubly stochastic 
Poisson model. Then we calculate the median default probability given a state (active firms 
or survival firms) for each year. 
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Figure 2. PD of insolvent firms.  This figure plots the one-year default probability of GI 
firms from 1986 to 2014. We first predict the default probability of individual firm based on 
the parameters estimated by the doubly stochastic Poisson model. Then we calculate the 
median default probability of all insolvent firms for each year. 
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Figure 3. PD spread between default and survival firms. This figure plots the one-year 
default probability of survival firms and the spread between survival and default firms from 
1986 to 2014. We first predict the default probability of individual firm based on the 
parameters estimated by the doubly stochastic Poisson model. Then we calculate the average 
default probability given a state (insolvent firms or survival firms) for each year. The spread 
is calculated as the median PD of insolvent firms minus that of survival firms. 
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Figure 4. PD of 7 Groups. This figure plots the one-year default probability which is 
decomposed to 7 groups‘ PD from 1986 to 2014. We first predict the default probability of 
individual firm based on the parameters estimated by the doubly stochastic Poisson model. 
Then we take the median default probability given a business line (accident & health; motor; 
marine, aviation & goods in transit; third-party liability; financial loss; household & domestic 
all risks and property; miscellaneous) for each year. 
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Figure 5. PD of 7 Groups. This figure plots the one-year default probability of 7 groups: 
Accident & Health, Motor, Marine, Aviation & Goods in transit, Third-party liability, 
Financial Loss, Household & Domestic all risks and property, and Miscellaneous from 1986 
to 2014. We first predict the default probability of individual firm based on the parameters 
estimated by the doubly stochastic Poisson model. Then we take the median default 
probability for a given business line for each year. 
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Figure 6. Credit spread when taking Reinsurance. Credit spread between firms accepting reinsurance and firms not accepting reinsurance at 
different levels (full sample calibration). Orange line: percentage of firms with reinsurance accepted at certain level; black stack: credit spread. 
